War Stories: How Religion and State Converge in the U.S. Military

Date: January 28, 2016
Location: Women’s Building Formal Lounge at Washington University in St. Louis

Laurie Maffly-Kipp:

Welcome to this afternoon’s panel discussion, sponsored by the John C. Danforth Center on Religion and Politics. I’m a faculty member at the center and former director of our fellows program. I encourage you to take information available on your way out this evening about the Center’s broader enterprise, including our other upcoming public events. I also invite you to join our email list, to contact us with any questions or feedback, and to follow our online journal on Religion and Politics.

As I hope many of you know by now, the Center serves as a nonpartisan, research-oriented, public-minded venue for fostering rigorous scholarship and informing both academic and broader community audiences about the intersections of religion and US politics. The Center strives to promote sustained engagement with the religious and political debates shaping American life now and in the past. Our program today also highlights one of the signal features of the mission of the Danforth Center: our fellows program. The Center sponsors two programs a year for early career visiting scholars; one for doctoral candidates in their final year of research and writing, and the other for postdoctoral scholars in the early stages of their careers. It is through these residential programs we bring to our research and teaching by gathering and supporting outstanding younger scholars. Today we are delighted to feature the work of one of our postdoctoral research fellows, Ronit Stahl. Ronit received her PhD in History from the University of Michigan in 2014. She also holds a Master’s degree in Social Sciences and Education from Stanford University, and a Bachelor’s degree in English from Williams College. Her research has been supported by numerous grants, including the Charlotte W. Newcomb dissertation fellowship. Her dissertation also won the Arthur Fondler award, for the best dissertation in the Michigan history department, as well as the Pro Quest Distinguished Dissertation Award. Her forthcoming book, Fighting with Faith: The Military Chaplaincy and the American State, from which this talk is drawn, is under contract with Harvard University Press. Ronit is also teaching a wonderful course for us this spring, entitled, “Virtues, Vices, Values: Regulating Morality in Modern America.” You can imagine the popularity of such a course among undergraduates. We’re very grateful for all of the ways that she has participated here over the last two years. Following Ronit’s presentation, we will hear a response from our visitor from Princeton, professor Margot Canaday. We are delighted to have her join us today. Prof. Canaday is a legal and political historian who studies gender and sexuality in modern America. She holds a BA from the University of Iowa, and a PhD from the University of Minnesota. Her first book, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in 20th Century America,
Princeton 2009, won the Organization of American Historian’s Ellis Hawley Prize, the American Political Science Association’s Gladdis M. Cammer Award, the American Studies Association’s Laura Romero Prize, the American Society for Legal History’s Cromwell Book Prize—is there anything you didn’t win?—the Committee on LGBT History’s John Boswell Prize, the Lambda Literary Award for LGBT Studies, as well as the Association of American Law School’s Order of the Coiff Biennial Book Award. Additionally, she has won fellowships from, among others, the Social Science Research Counsel, the Princeton University Society of Fellows, and the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study. She is also a co-editor of the series, “Politics and Culture in Modern America,” at the University of Pennsylvania Press. We have many awards among our two presenters today; it’s delightful to have you both here.

The last thing I want to say is that I want to make sure you all have seen the preparations for a meal that will be served after our conversation here; you are welcome to join us for that and to continue the conversation. Thank you very much.

**Ronit Stahl:**

I want to thank everyone for coming today and spending what turned out to be a lovely winter afternoon inside. I’m very excited to share a portion of my current research and book project with you today. Before I do so, I’d like to thank the Danforth Center for all of their support, both in creating a pleasant and intellectually nurturing environment to draft a book, and in making today’s event possible. In particular, thank you to our director, Marie Griffith, to Leigh Schmidt, who last year started organizing this talk, to Laurie for her introductions, and to all the rest of the faculty, my fellow post-docs, the dissertation fellows, and all of our affiliates who join us for stimulating conversation. Our support staff, Sheri Peña and Debra Kennard, who you may have met coming in, deserve a special mention, as they have done much of the work behind the scenes to make this possible—to get everything set up, to publicize it, and to make sure there is dinner afterwards. And, finally, I’m really grateful to Margot Canaday for coming to St. Louis for this event. I first met Margot as a graduate student, initially through her book and then in person. Her book was one of the formative influences on my own thinking about political and legal histories of state administration, regulation, bureaucracy and the military, but most importantly, she’s always been game for wonderful conversation, asking thought-provoking questions, and pushing me to think even more deeply about the stakes of the work I do. So, thank you.

The letter was incomprehensible. It was hard enough to read the words; her son had been killed in France on August 20, 1944. Was that really true? But it was the follow-up piece in the letter that shattered Rose Shapiro. If her child’s remains had received respectful and reverential care, how was it possible that his grave had been marked with a modest cross, and last rites of the Church were held, his grave blessed, and masses said regularly for him and others who had made the supreme sacrifices for their country. Her son was a Jewish soldier from Chicago. Why was he buried as a Catholic?
This puzzle, the question of how the military could mistakenly bury a soldier as a Catholic rather than a Jew, is one of three stories I’ll be exploring today. Despite the constitutional separation of church and state, the military chaplaincy mixes religion and state at all times, so each story I’ll tell reveals a particular dimension of this mixing, of the military chaplaincy, and together to point to the different scales, registers, and modes, in which the chaplaincy operated in the 20th century. After I tell and hopefully complicate some of these stories, I’ll offer some thoughts about how to make sense of the military chaplaincy as an institution that dwells in the arena of both state and religion. So, to return to the question with which I began: what exactly happened to Private Leonard Shapiro?

That was the question Army Chief of Chaplains William R. Arnold set about trying to untangle. Was it a case of mistaken identity, a matter of religious opacity, an instance of bureaucratic blunder? Addressing these questions began with a factual discovery. What, exactly, was marked on the soldier’s dog tag? This was important, because, as Arnold wrote to the chaplain who penned the condolence letter, “Mrs. Shapiro is, as the name so strongly suggests, Jewish; she is no little distraught that her son received a Catholic, rather than a Jewish, burial.” He posed several questions in an attempt to illicit what happened and why. Was it possible the soldier had converted, he wondered? Was there uncertainty or doubt about his religious preference? But if so, couldn’t his buddies have provided the necessary information? Finally, was the incident merely a mix-up, perhaps a letter sent in error?

When soldiers could not speak, dog tags, the military identification tags that included name, serial number, and religious affiliation, declared their faith for them; or, eventually they did. It was a process stymied by the subversion of standardization and efficiency. Actually, the state first required soldiers to wear dog tags in World War I; as you can see here, it did not include religion. It included name, rank, and unit, but no indication of religious affiliation. By World War II, however, dog tags had changed, and they included significantly more information, as you can see here; there’s the soldier’s name, their blood type, the date of their tetanus shot, the branch to which they belong, and as you can see on the right side of each dog tag, next to the number, there’s a P, a C, or an H, for Protestant, Catholic, or Hebrew (which was used at the time). These were the options available for soldiers in World War II. They got one of three religions: Protestant, Catholic, or Jew. These rules could be broken; there were some Mormons, for example, who asked to use LDS in place of Protestant because, as they said, “We are in no way Protestant,” and while the military did not formally allow this or accommodate this request, on a few rare occasions a Mormon managed to find a commanding officer who maybe didn’t know the rules or regulations and he would permit the LDS men to have LDS on their dog tags. But no matter what choices the soldiers made, mortality loomed over the decision, because the dog tag determined how the military identified and buried the dead, and whether soldiers discussed their selection with their family was rarely clear. Imprecision frequently characterized dog tags, for multiple reasons. As Chaplain Lymen Barett, who was stationed at Okinawa, recalled, “When we would
bury men, we would not always go by the name on the dog tags, because superstitious soldiers believed that their own dog tags attracted bullets, so they exchanged dog tags with one another,” which led Barett and other chaplains to add layers of verification to try to confirm identities. This was Standard Operating Procedure, and yet many chaplains were forced to move through far more tacit signs of religious identity. When the Chief of Chaplains wrote to the chaplain of Leonard Shapiro’s unit to inquire about his procedures, the chaplain who was then deployed somewhere in France apologized profusely and hastened to clarify what had happened. Confusion had indeed reigned, and in the absence of a clearly designated religious preference, that is, no religion on his dog tag, which was also an option that some Jewish soldiers in WW2 selected, particularly if they were going to Europe and were concerned about becoming POWs in Germany, the chaplain had to make a decision, and from the list of names that he had he selected the names he thought were of a Catholic faith. Inadvertently, I selected the name Shapiro to be an Italian name, and one that was Catholic. Unfamiliar with Jewish names, the chaplain saw a name that ended in a vowel and designated it Catholic.

Enforcing religious clarity through dog tags and personnel lists would preclude this problem, he asserted. The state, in other words, needed to collect and maintain better information. Insisting that soldiers designate religion on dog tags would prevent these mishaps. So, after unravelling the enigma of Private Shapiro’s battlefield burial, the chief of chaplains sent his regrets to Rose Shapiro. Through the Jewish welfare board, the civilian organization that endorsed Jewish chaplains and mediated Jewish personnel needs during the war, Arnold apologized. He also promised to rectify the situation by directing the theatre chaplain to replace the grave’s cross with a star of David and to locate a Jewish chaplain to conduct a proper memorial service. This eight-month exchange during wartime between Rose Shapiro, the chaplain in the field, the chief of chaplains, and the JWB, was both anomalous and routine. For the Shapiro family, the effort to trace the circumstances was a singular moment, a one-time problem that brought them into close contact with representatives of the state. Now, they had some other contact with representatives of the state; Rose Shapiro, for example, does appear on the 1940 census, the 1930 census, and the 1920 census; so we know that she did probably encounter a poll-taker. She also mailed her letter, which means of course she went to the post office. But these, of course, were more fleeting and less momentous interactions with the state. The census tells us that she had moved with her family from a large apartment building a few blocks away in 1930 to a smaller three-family flat by 1940. It was probably a move up, and had Chaplain Martin, the chaplain for Leonard’s unit, been familiar with Chicago, he might have picked up on her son’s religion, because they lived in North Laundale, which in the 1940s was a heavily Jewish neighborhood; about 70%. Rose also had more invisible encounters with the federal government. She probably didn’t know it, but her apartment was in an area redlined by the New Deal American Homeowners Association, so she was actually right on the edge of it. This is probably something she had know idea it was going on. In that sense, this exchange with the military chaplaincy was probably one of her more momentous interactions with the federal government.
In contrast to a family, for the office of the Chief of Chaplains, interfacing with the public represented a typical day’s work. Implementing the state’s religious vision meant navigating between military and civilian spheres and negotiating with different religious groups. Religions differ, and war brought Americans into contact with new, different, and sometimes unrecognizable faiths. Chaplains could know this and still err, because prior to military service, most clergy had limited interaction with members of different faiths. Many of them talk about this in memoirs about the war. Thus arose the predicament of a chaplain who simply did not know that Shapiro was a Jewish name. In contrast, of course, the Chief of Chaplains did recognize that, for he had been in service for several decades and was accustomed to working between religious groups. And as the intense familial reaction and the diligent pursuit of a solution to Leonard Shapiro’s improper burial indicate, war deaths amplified the importance of state knowledge of religion, religious identities, and religious practices. The story does not end with the religiously appropriate burial of Shapiro, however. The state’s investment in religious identity as marked on dog tags also gave other religious groups leverage to negotiate with the armed forces, and try to push the state to recognize their faith. Most notably in the early post-war years, Japanese Americans petitioned the military to distinguish Buddhism as an American religion. Their predicament was especially pernicious; they were neither Protestants nor Catholics nor Jews, but had no other options, and the state defaulted to the category of Protestant. That was the label they received. So here is a petition that is in mass circulation in the late 1940s, and this just gives you a sense; it actually takes up an entire archive box, and it is the only box in the entire collection of the Chief of Chaplains that does not have a war decimal classification number, which is their library classification system. Despite the extensive lobbying efforts by Buddhists and their allies, including a lot of politicians from Hawaii and California, the by then Chief of Chaplains, Luther Miller, deemed the 3-religion protocol satisfactory, because, he said, this identification was still optional. Limiting personnel to three religious classifications he argued simply reduced confusion. Allowing additional markers of religious affiliation, he warned, could lead to the approximately 250 American denominations, as enumerated on the 1936 Census of Religious Bodies, to seek their own specific IDs. Miller was perceptive; other religious groups squirmed under that same ill-fitting P and coveted acknowledgement. As the Buddhist campaign for recognition gained momentum in the late 1940s, the Greek Orthodox pled their case as well. The indiscriminate designation as either Protestant or Catholic was unfair, they alleged, especially because, “the Orthodox Faith is practically as large as the Jewish faith, which is recognized by the proper agency as a principal denomination. These efforts to drum up support seemed to go nowhere, as J. Edgar Marriot—head of Marriot Enterprises, but also the head of the Mormon Military Relations Committee forecast—“even though we do not consider ourselves Protestant,” he told the elders, “it would be very difficult for the War department to separate us from the smaller Christian denominations and to put us in a different category. If they did this for our church, it would have the same request from many other minority groups. So in trying to contain rather than splinter American religion, the military struggled to
account for extant diversity in place of fictive unity. But advocacy nudged forward; in January 1949, Chief of Chaplains Miller conceded that a new option might be valuable, recommending an X for those soldiers whose religious affiliation does not fit any of the three principle denominations. With an X on the dog tag, the soldier could wear another marker of faith, perhaps. But the X was indeed an imperfect compromise; it conceded the presence of additional religions outside the rubric of tri-faith America, but refused to acknowledge them as actual religions. The campaign trudged on, with American Muslims writing to Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952 asking him to designate Islam on dog tags. He demurred, though intimated that as president he might effect change—maybe a vote or two, too. Over time, petitions did grind things down; first, in 1954, the military acceded to the Jewish request to use J, a religious signifier, rather than H, for Hebrew, a racial marker. Additional changes soon followed. By 1955, the New York Times reported, “every soldier may have his particular religion stamped on his identification tag.” And finally, by July 1959, the military formalized the chain in regulations; these regulations authorized spelling out religious preferences, thereby alleviating the problems caused by initials. There were, though, only 18 letters to be used for this task, so some abbreviations were still necessary. This shift to spelling out “Buddhist” or “Presbyterian,” “Orthodox” or “Muslim” was hardly radical, but victory was complicated. Enabling infinite options removed the validation that accompanied official abbreviations. Nevertheless, the increasing religious diversity of the United States did force the military to confront demographic realities. Most importantly, the dog tag serves as a potent reminder that the religious encounter with the state is as much an individual process and family experience as it is one of faith and nation. The dog tag connected the soldier, religion, and the state. It also linked families on the home front to war, American empire, and the globe. The state’s efforts to parse the mixed-up dog tags of Leonard Shapiro represented an upsetting, and meaningful, engagement with the state for his family. For others left outside the Protestant-Catholic-Jew rubric, the state’s recalcitrance to adapt the dog tags to reflect a more accurate reality, was likewise intensely aggravating but ultimately perhaps more profound, personally and politically.

2.

Exactly what happened as the ship listed and finally slunk beneath the frigid North Atlantic waters on that cold winter night will never be certain. This much is clear: less than an hour after midnight on February 3, 1943, a German U-Boat torpedoed the Dorchester, one of six ships in a convoy heading from Newfoundland to a US Army command base in Greenland. The sea had churned with danger as the Dorchester entered what was then called “Torpedo Junction.” Less than 100 miles from safe harbor, the ship’s captain received word that submarines had been detected, and he ordered all 900 men aboard to sleep in their life jackets. Less than thirty. Minutes elapsed between the torpedo blast and the disappearance of the luxury liner-turned-military transport ship into the iceberg-laden ocean. Two of the convoy’s escort ships rescued frozen survivors, 226 in all. While the Dorchester was
equipped with enough life jackets for all aboard, and while there were other ships in the region, panic and hypothermia killed most of the men aboard.

Among the 674 men who died that night were four chaplains; George L. Fox, a Methodist minister, Clark V. Polling, a Dutch Reformed minister, John P. Washington, a Catholic priest, and Alexander B. Good, a rabbi. The chaplains knew most men were scared, cold, and ill prepared as they clambered into lifeboats and jumped into the ocean. The chaplains encouraged terrified soldiers to act like sailors and get in the boats; Chaplain Washington fastened a life preserver on an unprotected young man; Chaplain Good gave away his gloves and then his boots; Chaplain Polling pushed men into the waves, and Chaplain Fox waved and wished men luck. All four tossed their life jackets to others, before linking arms, praying in English, Latin, and Hebrew, and going down together, having abandoned neither ship, nor sailor, nor spirit.

News of these deaths filtered out slowly; the chaplains’ families first received notification that the men were missing at sea about 10 days after the Dorchester went down. Almost 2 months later, the press began publishing articles about the calamitous night. Despite the time lag, the American reaction was swift and unambiguous. Newspaper coverage dubbed the four chaplains heroes, and were quickly honored for their sacrifice. For those who survived a bitter night tossing in the hypothermic sea, the chaplains’ unselfish and cooperative last stand was courageous and uplifting. Memories and first-person accounts of the chaplains’ dedication resonated and quickly spurred commemorations of the immortal chaplains. Within five years, a three cent postage stamp brought the image of the four chaplains, who exemplified interfaith in action, to American mailboxes. Comics also memorialized the chaplains for American youth, and stained glass windows, chapels, and awards quickly followed. The symbolic power of the chaplains aboard the Dorchester was unmistakable: it highlighted ecumenical generosity in its highest form and the promise of American faith in its darkest hour. But the oft-used and much-lauded emblem of American religious unity was far more complicated than four men of different faiths praying together in the face of imminent death. The state played roles both obvious and invisible. The office of War Information, in collaboration with private ventures, had crafted a political culture that trained Americans to understand the Dorchester in richly figurative and vividly momentous terms. Radio shows, like “Chaplain Gym,” a soap-opera style serial that had debuted on NBC’s Blue Network 10 months before the Dorchester, coached listeners to understand religion as vital to the war effort. Between the night the Dorchester was attacked and the time Americans read about it, they saw Norman Rockwell’s “Freedom to Worship” painting in the Saturday Evening Post and months later the US Treasury adopted it to advertise its 1943 war bond campaign. The sacrifice of the four chaplains and the ability of Americans to apprehend it as heroic depended on individual decisions and state action. Although the specific chaplains aboard the Dorchester was an accidental collection of people, deliberate policy making determined that they would be white, well-educated, and ecumenically inclined. Two other chaplains were removed from the duty roster just hours before the ship
left port, and a colonel overseeing personnel simply selected two more names to
join them. The military had committed to staffing transport ships with both
Protestant and Catholic chaplains; it just happened that a Jewish chaplain was
already assigned to that voyage. The chaplains that died that night were white
because the World War Two military was a Jim Crow institution; Black chaplains did
serve, but only in African American units. So even if spirituality transcended the
color line, chaplain assignments did not. Since the Dorchester did not have any
African American units aboard, there were no Black chaplains. Indeed, the
chaplaincy had quite a mixed record on race. It was the first entity to desegregate its
officer training school, and did so in World War I; of the five black officers who
remained in the military between world wars, three were chaplains. Yet the
chaplaincy also ignored the Double V campaigns push to change the status of African
Americans writ large, and did nothing to change the chaplains’ assignments by race.
From the army’s perspective, the boundaries of religion ended at the door to civil
rights; the gospel, it seemed to think, had very little to say about segregation. The
admonition to focus on religious work and sideline racial matters was actually
impossible; race and religion regularly comingle, often bedeviling bureaucrats, but
never separating from one another. The image here is of Chaplain Luther Fuller, who
was deployed to the South Pacific and at one point gave a sermon critiquing the
military for its Jim Crow policies, which landed him in a lot of trouble. He was,
according to some of his soldiers, almost lynched—it’s not exactly clear what
happened—but he was sent back to the United States some say as punishment,
others as a protective measure, and ultimately while not court marshalled did face a
reclassification hearing that stripped him of his commission. Because race relations
stood separate from the military’s project of promoting religious toleration, the four
immortal chaplains represented “interfaith in action” but could never have
suggested integration in action. Far from unusual, then, the curious incident of the
four chaplains of the night points to how normal interfaith, or at least tri-faith,
America had become by 1943. Had there been an African-American chaplain aboard
the ship, the American public would have barked. Instead, as Sherlock Holmes
deduced, “If the dog didn’t bark, no strangers interrupted the night.” Instead, the
four chaplains’ decision to link together as one as they slipped into the frigid North
Atlantic waters reflected twenty-five years of state policy in support of religious, but
not racial, pluralism. It took an act of legislation in World War I to open the
chaplaincy to faiths outside mainline Protestants and Catholics. Passed on October
6, 1917, the Chaplains At Large Bill allowed division commanders to apply to the
adjutant general of the army for the services of chaplains at large, of the Jewish,
Christian Science, Eastern Catholic (by which they meant Eastern Orthodox),
Mormon, and Salvation Army denominations, if they deemed that there were
sufficient numbers of adherents of such faiths in their division to render chaplains at
large necessary. Demarcating space for these chaplains at large instigated what
would become a decades-long project to redefine American religion—to untether
American religion from Christianity, from mainstream groups, and from large
percentages of the American population. By the end of WW1, one Salvation Army,
three Mormon, eleven Christian Science, and twenty-five Jewish chaplains had
donned uniforms. Although religious pluralism was imperfectly executed and
riddled with tension, several chaplains indicated how pleasurable this experience had been for them in WW1. One such chaplain, Frank Wilson, an Episcopalian priest, recalled flourishing in the multireligious milieu of war. Reminiscing about his work in Europe, he wrote, "So there you have it: the Jewish feast of Porum, celebrated by American soldiers in Italy, in a Young Men's Christian Association Hut, addressed by an Episcopalian chaplain, refreshments being furnished by the Red Cross, and cigarettes donated by the Roman Catholic Knights of Columbus. By World War II, the military created administrative processes to support its multifaith endeavor. While each denomination mustered its own men for the military, the application process sought to ferret out the fair-minded from the narrowly sectarian. Here you see the application of George Aki, who was a Japanese American Congregationalist minister. There were, in fact, four Japanese-American Christian ministers who served as chaplains in World War II, passing muster both as religious figures and through the military. Japanese Americans, unlike every other chaplain in WW2, had to be screened by the military before accepting commissions. Nevertheless, you get a little bit of the questions they were asking on these applications to assess how they might fit. The federal council of churches, the primary civilian Protestant body, tried to ensure that only the right men would be chosen for pressing for information about an applicant's attitudes on democracy, interdenominational cooperation, social problems, economic order, people of different religious and racial background, pacifism, and militarism. You can see here also that chart on the right-hand side, personal qualities that references were expected to rate prospective chaplains on. The ideal chaplain could wrestle angels like the Biblical Jacob and make decisions like Solomon. To be fit for service meant holding correct opinions, acclaiming democracy, applauding ecumenicism, praising capitalism, tolerating difference, and accepting military force as necessary. Once selected for the chaplaincy, chaplain school reinforced the reality of a multifaith military; initially located at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, the army chaplain school moved to the grounds of Harvard University in August 1942, and the navy to the college of William and Mary. Those were both done to accommodate ever-increasing cohorts, which had grown from 75 to 405 men at a time. The stated purpose of the 5-6 week sessions was, in military parlance, indoctrination—not in religion, which the military assumed the men already had in the way of seminary training, but in the ways of military life. Here you see chaplains learning how to use instruments to read maps, for example. There was a lot of work to make sure they could understand rank and insignia, understood how to march in order, and other facets of military life they probably had little knowledge of before entering the military. Dorm rooms provided indoctrination of another sort; the school intentionally assigned men to rooms with clergy of different denominations in order to cultivate an ethos of religious cooperation. The point was not to disregard denominational difference, but to convey respect for it. Harold Saperstein, a Jewish chaplain from New York, bunked with two Catholic priests and one Protestant minister. "They are all very fine fellows," he recorded, "and we get along splendidly." Saperstein learned the lesson the army hoped he would, finding that uniform-clad clergy made it difficult to tell the difference between the faiths. Chaplain school remained integrated through WW2, and from the best I can tell, though this is a little difficult given the state of the
records, they actually did have interracial lodging. Not all incoming chaplains interpreted this interfaith lodging project in the same terms. Lymen Barrett, a Mormon chaplain who travelled from Salt Lake City to Cambridge to attend chaplain school, indeed noticed that the six in the room were of six different denominations. The Mormon was surprised by their habits; they drank coffee, tea, and liquor, they smoked, they caroused in the evenings, and they seemed to him sexually libertine. Despite his disdain for the ideas and conduct of those in his room, he still talked to them, and learned from them. He shipped down to Okinawa, where, he later reminisced, “I enjoined my association with Latter-Day Saint men, and Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish men.” He absorbed the message of chaplain school, even as he resisted some of its carriers. Understanding the Dorchester and the four chaplains who sacrificed their lives for their men and American values, means recognizing that American ideals, military indoctrination, and state policy coalesced in the image of four wise men, praying aloud, each to his own maker, each in his own way, each to his own end. But it also means recognizing who was left out, not accidentally, but as a direct result of policy choices made by the state.

3.

Their mission was a secret. The men knew on some level that it was important, possibly even significant. They knew they had made it through a rigorous selection process; they knew they had prepared for eight long months. They knew their work was dangerous, and that it could fail. But they also heard the laughter of their fellow servicemen, felt the ridicule heaped on their silent effort, and wondered about the murky effects of their constant, if seemingly ineffective and measly practice runs. When the selected men assembled at 8 o’clock that evening, they recognized that the briefing was different. At long last, they knew their charge. When their clocks hit midnight, when Sunday turned to Monday, they met again, to finalize their plan, gather their equipment, and receive their final instructions. And then, before they departed, they prayed. Chaplain William B. Downey, a Lutheran minister, led the group, voicing their wishes in the heat of the dark, humid, Pacific night. “Almighty father, guard and protect them; may they, as well as we, know Thy strength and power, and armed with Thy might, may they bring this war to a rapid end, and once more may we know peace on earth.” Nine hours later, the American crew of the Enola Gay dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. As the bomb eviscerated the Japanese supply and shipping depot, the radio relay called back to base: “Mission successful.” Blinded by the light of the blast, the men could not see the destruction they had wrought. Nevertheless, Captain Robert Lewis reported a different reaction: “My God.” Colonel Paul W. Tibitz Jr., the pilot of the Enola Gay, saw only a black broiling nest below. The bomb’s mushroom clouds obscured the obliterated city and the immediate decimation of 1/3 of Hiroshima’s population. But the men still understood the gravity of their action. It was a sobering moment, Tibitz said, when they felt the shock waves of devastation before flying back to Tinian Island. Upon their arrival, Chaplain Downey found their prayers partially answered. All of the men flying B-29s on August 6, 1945 returned. His supplication for the rapid end of war went unheeded. Three days later Chaplain Downey prayed again, “Almighty
God, Father of all Mercies, we pray thee to be gracious with those who fly this night. Guard and protect those of us who venture out into the darkness of thy heaven. Uphold them on their wings; keep them safe both in body and soul and bring them back to us. Above all else, our father, bring peace to our world.” This time, all the men, including the chaplain, knew what they were doing. This time, the prayer was far more ambivalent, seeking God’s grace for men who would undoubtedly kill. This time, the bomb’s early light meant a reckoning with the dark and barbarous underbelly of the kingdom of God on earth. And within twelve hours, another crew of American pilots, bombardiers, and navigators found a hole in the cloud cover and detonated a second atomic bomb over Nagasaki. Less than a week later, Japan surrendered, bringing an end to WW2, and bringing forth a chance for the peace for which Downey had prayed. Few actions taken by the US Military in WW2 were as controversial as the decision to deploy the product of the Manhattan Project. Even when justifying the use of atomic weapons, Secretary of War Henry Stimpson characterized the months-long decision-making process as one of the gravest made by our government. It’s worth asking, I think, why the chaplain was there.

The simple answer is that the pilot, Paul Tibitz, asked him to be. This was not necessarily unusual, as chaplains often blessed missions. In December 1944, as rain stymied the Allied effort to liberate Germany, General George Patton had asked Chaplain James O’Neill, a Catholic priest, for a weather prayer. The chaplain complied, and Patton liked it so much that he printed it and distributed it as his Christmas greeting. As you can see on the screen, the prayer read, “Almighty and Most Merciful Father, we humbly beseech Thee, of Thy great goodness, to restrain those immoderate rains with which we have to contend. Grant us fair weather for battle. Graciously harken to us, as soldiers who call upon thee, armed with thy power, we may advance from victory to victory and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies and establish Thy justice among men and nations. Amen.”

Praying for good weather was much less controversial than blessing the crew who dropped the bomb, but it does suggest the importance the military placed on using religion to sanctify and sanction action. Religion, in other words, could offer moral cover in uncertain times. And if few specific decisions received as much moral scrutiny as the decision to use of the bomb to end WW2 and usher in the nuclear age, few wars produced as deep and withering criticism as Vietnam.

4.

For military chaplains, moral fracturing was real and religious reckoning constant. Enmeshed in the armed forces and ever-cognizant of the protest fulminating around them, clergy in uniform shipped out to Vietnam, where they spent twelve months doubting and measuring their value. Chaplain Leonard Arnsbrack, a minister from the Assemblies of God, confided, “As the gigantic footfalls of the Vietcong mortars stomped their way up the ridgeline toward our positions, I had to ask myself why in the name of common sense I was there.” As the booming sounds fell away, the
minister regained his composure. The voice of a Marine and the words, “Padre, I’m glad you’re here with us,” reaffirmed the necessity of having been there. The lone soldier on the bombarded traverse occupied a critical place in the debates over the chaplaincy in the 1960s. In fact, even the Supreme Court referred to the isolated soldier as a justified rational for mixing religion and state in the chaplaincy in the 1963 Avington v. Shep decision which struck down school-sponsored bible readings.

While some religious leaders rejected the chaplaincy as an instrument of a military involved in an immoral war, others deliberated whether their faith dictated that religious obligation to men superseded moral objection to war. For those chaplains, and for the religious groups supporting them, the central question of the Vietnam war was whether God and country could align or must diverge. In other words, should chaplains occupy a prophetic role or a pastoral one? Vietnam pushed clergy to reconcile pure fidelity to God with complex responsibility to man.

As you can see on this brochure about chaplains in Vietnam, there are chaplains in front but the interesting symbolic logo at top which involves not just a cross and a Jewish star, but a Buddhist wheel and in the middle a sign of one of the indigenous religions in Vietnam.

Notably, in the years between WW2 and Vietnam, Chaplains had become formally responsible for character education and moral conduct in the military. They had long held this role informally, but it became part of their regular tasks in the late 1940s and 1950s. The assumed comingling of religion and morality really defined the chaplaincy during the Cold War. Vietnam exposed the faultlines in these presumptions; when war provoked moral turmoil and signaled immorality, were clergy bearing rank and insignia sanctifying profane militarism and absolving the state of unconscionable conduct? As the Vietnam war racked the nation, the military chaplaincy became a critical arena of conflict, a venue through which religious groups contested American politics, argued about moral priorities, and reconsidered their relationship to the state. At the center of these debates lay claims about the meaning and consequence of conscience on individual, national, and global scales. As Vietnam polarized the country, chaplains and religious groups questioned the object of religious and ethical imperatives. To whom were chaplains obligated, and for what causes or what reasons should clergy serve? There is a vast amount of material about this debate in this time, but two key books came out—one, “Vietnam, Crisis of Conscience,” which was written by Robert Macathy Brown who had been a chaplain in WW2, they were writing it for the clergy and laity concerned about Vietnam and offered a critique of the war of the military of any religious groups involved in supporting it. Chaplain John O’Connor writes a rejoinder to them; a chaplain looks at Vietnam directly talking to them, and he is a very interesting figure because he had served in Vietnam, he comes back, he’s high in the military hierarchy, he becomes the Navy Chief of Chaplains in 1975, when he leaves the military he becomes the Archbishop of New York, and during the 1980s he actually becomes quite critical of the military, and rescinds his criticism of Vietnam. But it
gives us the sense of the high stakes of this debate in the late 1960s that these books come out very quickly and are talking to one another.

When religious groups failed to find sufficient numbers of ministers to stop the chaplaincy they started to equivocate about the meaning of military service. The federal council of churches, which was by then the National Council of Churches, editorialized that the role of military chaplain does not imply an endorsement of war in general or any war in particular. The Central Council of American Rabbis made a similar plea, asserting that military chaplains are not propagandists and do not give a moral sanction to war. Even the National Association of Evangelicals’ Chaplain Commission, which generally supported military endeavours, described their men as appalled at how complex the problems are. The military was less sanguine; the Airforce Military Chief of Chaplains stated that “Every chaplain should understand that although he does not personally carry a weapon, as per Geneva Convention Protocol, he is still part of a combat team which is fighting for victory in an armed conflict.” The dispute over whether serving as a chaplain conveyed an endorsement of war arose precisely because all military chaplains were volunteers. As clergy, they held automatic exemptions from the draft. Chaplains, then, represented an exceptional group: a group of men who by dint of their ordination as clergy did not have to fulfill one of the primary responsibilities of male citizenship in the 20th century, bearing arms for the state. By 1968 these ethical questions so flummoxed navy chief of chaplains James W. Kelley as he prepared for a press conference immediately before the Tet Offensive, the Catholic priest asked his military subordinates a somewhat unusual question. Did they consider American participation in the war of Vietnam to be morally right or morally wrong? Not a typical question for the chief of chaplains to be asking any of the men under him. That even he and the chaplaincy could not avoid discussing the moral debates over Vietnam underscores the shifting role of the chaplain. The opportunity lost or taken to critique the state from within. Unlike Chaplain Downy meeting with the crew of the Enola Gay, this reckoning was public. It could not duck the moral questions prompted by military action in Southeast Asia, and it threatened to destroy the military chaplaincy altogether. The chaplaincy survived, but the institutional contours were forever changed, not by one or two nights on Tinnian island, but through the public communal and private processes of grappling with the moral quagmire of Vietnam. As chaplain John O’Connor wrote in an end of tour report, “The night has a thousand eyes, Vietnam has 10,000 faces. Every chaplain sees a different face. To write of the war in Vietnam as viewed by the chaplain, or to write of the chaplain’s ministry of the war in Vietnam would be to do the reader a disservice. I can write accurately of only one war in Vietnam, of very few of her faces, and of the way I personally attempted to function.” The individual, the nation, and the world. The chaplaincy brought all of them together, and Vietnam created a new definition of chaplaincy and of obligation. Military clergy stood at the interface of God and country; loyal to God, and to soldiers reckoning with God. Examining how the state mobilized for war demonstrates that religion was rarely separate from the workings of the state. At times the state coopted religion to advance its goals, but religious believers also pushed back, challenging the state to live up to the
pluralistic and moral standards it claimed to uphold. I hope these war stories have illuminated some of the features of the military chaplaincy.

Now I want to turn to some of the larger implications and interventions of this work as a way to answer a big question: what does happen when religion and state converge? What do these stories mean?

My larger project stretches from WW1 to the 1980s. But I intentionally focused on WW2 today and used them to think backwards and forwards in time. While many American historians use WW2 as a breaking point, I want to argue that WW2 is a tremendous turning point for the history of both state administration and the history of American religion. And to see that, we have to keep the war in the middle of the frame. WW2 is often used to mark the beginning of tri-faith America or to signal the start of a Judeo-Christian nation that operated as an antidote to Soviet atheism during the cold war. But my book will argue something quite different; WW2 is the zenith, the high point, of this vision of religious pluralism, as exemplified by the easy installation of the four chaplains as one of its symbols. I argue, actually, that this state-sponsored project of religious pluralism began in earnest in WW1, and it was done to provide a means to consolidate white ethnicity, to move from an almost infinite variety of white ethnic groups to three clear religious groups, with African-Americans and other minorities occasionally acknowledged as present but outside this religious structure. But in WW2, the vision as announced by the army—and this is very clear in army documents and its collection of statistics—the rubric was Protestant, Catholic, Jew, Negro, with race and religion awkwardly placed together as the same—or maybe, quite different, but not sure how to handle that difference. Religious groups reacted to these indirect state pressures, and as in politics, religious progressives and fundamentalists, mainline and minority faiths, responded to one another as well as to military policy. Thus, by the time Will Herber published his seminal text, Protestant, Catholic, Jew, in 1955, the easy tri-faith moment had passed. Indeed, he was describing the past, not the present. Even in WW2, this ideal was already fracturing. On the Scylla of race and tribades of unaccounted for religious diversity. To be clear, it wasn’t just African Americans and Japanese Americans, or the Eastern Orthodox and Buddhists knocking on the door; it was also evangelicals and fundamentalist Christians who saw access to the military chaplaincy, and through it, to state power. The national association of Evangelicals was formed in 1942, and one of its first subcommittees was its chaplains committee. While the ww2 era army chaplaincy was often uncertain about just who these evangelicals and fundamentalists were; at one point in an office meeting the Chief of Chaplains’ subordinate suggested that the “fundamentalists seemed to be a group of congregationalists, Methodists, Baptists, out of line with their denominations, probably on the question of fundamentalism.” Much like a second grader defining a word via its components, they really had no idea what to do, but understand that whatever or whoever these fundamentalists were, the Chief feels they should be represented. Conservative Protestants were not exactly a minority, but they faced a significant challenge in joining the chaplaincy. They needed to find sufficient number of ministers who met the education requirements
for chaplains, namely holding bachelor’s degrees and ordination from graduate seminaries. In 1951, the NEA’s chaplain’s commission agreed with Navy Chief of Chaplains Stanton Salsbury, who said, “I want chaplains who are as well-educated as any officer on this ship, so that the admiral, if in need, will feel free to visit the chaplain for advice.” The opportunity for a chaplain to advise a ranking superior was appealing; it aligned with Reverend Billy Graham’s pronouncement of the chaplaincy when he visited soldiers in Korea in 1951 as “one of the greatest missionary undertakings,” and this justified a more rigorous approach to education. More pointedly, the NEA declared, “Some are of the opinion that educational standards are too high, but this commission feels that the very best we can produce is none too good. At the present time, let us take the long-range view. Within four years we will be able to adequately supply chaplains for this great mission field.”

The negotiation between the evangelicals and the military at the mid-century points to a different point. That the military represents a significant, albeit sometimes overlooked, state space, not merely as a tool that carried out foreign policy objectives, but contra Ben Carson’s recently expressed concern, “as a grand social experiment.” Indeed, the military proved to be an ideal laboratory for the state to tinker with diversity in the 20th Century. The history of the chaplaincy thus offers a new perspective on the military, which is often viewed as an authoritarian and conservative institution. True, the military’s religious division was, like the rest of the armed forces, hierarchical and coercive, but it was also progressive, innovative, and pragmatic, frequently using its power to press for more equitable treatment of religious and racial minorities. I didn’t talk about this a lot today, but a number of religious groups saw the chaplaincy as the venue through which to lobby for better treatment, and once enacted in the military could apply it to civilian life as well. In this way, the military chaplaincy has also served as a bellwether for American social, religious, and political change. The military chaplaincy accepted Catholics and Jews as clergy much earlier than Catholics and Jews were accepted in American society; the chaplaincy integrated chaplain schools long before public schools integrated. The military grappled with evangelical political interests in the 1950s well before historians talk about evangelicals entering into politics in the 1970s. And the military handled concerns from Muslims and Sikhs at midcentury. These are issues that continue through today to be sure, but they were already talking about them in the 1950s. And finally, the military appointed women as chaplains even as the Equal Rights Amendment was failing. Over the 20th century, the state, through the military, molded American religion into an entity distinct from a single totalizing faith, but nevertheless contingent on a set of ideas and praxis. The military recast faith from personal belief and universalizing aims to what I call moral monotheism, which directed men to believe in a single God and behave ethically. And it was important, of course, that it was men, because the military was dealing primarily with men over the course of the 20th century. In this way, the federal government legitimized multiple claims to truth. Theologically loose and ritually pliant, moral monotheism made the military’s mottoes “unity without uniformity” and “cooperation without compromise” possible, if also quite unwieldy. This was not an unbounded worldview, but rather the military could promote American religion precisely because it circumscribed participation in the chaplaincy to a large yet limited
population. By actively managing religion in the armed forces, the state did build a more pluralist nation, albeit one always tempered by what the military's idea of what religion was. This is important because religion has long been notably absent from narratives of state administration and bureaucracy, and yet religion has been fundamental to the aims and operations of both.

This underscores a third point: that religion and state constantly shaped and influenced one another. Religion is much more than a theological idea; in the U.S., religion exists as an always contested legal and political category, as well as an administrative and bureaucratic one. As Margot has pointed out in her work on sexuality and citizenship, regulation changed what was regulated. The state set parameters for religion in the armed forces through standards, policies, and operating procedures. In turn, these requirements exerted indirect pressure on religions and denominations to conform to these guidelines, or to advocate changing them. In this sense, the military attracted religions through both carrot and stick; the military beckoned with possibilities, to serve one's country, to reach young men, to be recognized as legitimate, to imprint God on the nation, and to exert state power. And, in the case of proselytizing faiths, to acquire souls. For many groups, the military represented an irresistible opportunity, but as a coercive institution, the military also required adherence to certain norms—by soldiers, by officers, by chaplains, and ultimately by religions too. The military could force many things; it acted with force, it took with force, it claimed with force, and it ruled with force. But it could not force faith; it could, however, strongly encourage and build structures to fortify faith, and that it did.

There are many reasons the American state has had a vested interest in promoting religion in its ranks, but to understand how it was possible to do so, I want to make one final, possibly provocative point about the convergence of religion and state in the military. It is helpful, I think, to conceive of the military chaplaincy as a public utility. When we think of utilities we often think of entities like railroads, highways, electricity and water; these are projects undertaken or underwritten by the government, often in conjunction with private money, to provide a benefit to citizens and residents, but they are not pure or an unmitigated good. It mattered where railroad tracks were built, as it meant the difference between a city becoming a commercial hub or dwindling into a neglected town. This is a map of railroads in American is 1890, which is the moment at which the federal government had to rescue railroads from catastrophic failure. It also mattered where highways were constructed, as it meant the difference between a neighborhood remaining part of a downtown core or becoming an underfunded space of urban blight. It mattered when electricity arrived in the South and other areas, as it supported new migration, new economies, and paved the way for a booming post-War defense industry. And it mattered, as we’ve seen particularly this month in Flint, what rivers and treatment plants supply a city’s water. That often can mark the difference between health and sickness, or acceptable water and poisonous water. In all of these examples, the utility can be beneficial and pernicious, creating growth and poverty, opportunity and failure. The state backed these utilities, and the decisions and distinctions made
through them, in excluding and including spaces and people, and these decisions express values held and debated by the state through both formal policy and diffuse administration. Utilities are not just products; they are processes that are always evolving, always under construction, and always unable to meet everyone’s needs and desires. What I particularly like about this schematic from the 1970s about the federal highways system is the way it recognized that this is still 20 years after initially being built, a work in progress, and one that anyone who lives in a metropolitan area knows is always a work in progress.

The 20th century military chaplaincy operated in much the same way. Although chaplains had been part of the American military since the Revolution, the reorganization of the military in the early 20th century, the incorporation of the chaplaincy into the command hierarchy, the growth of the chaplaincy as a vehicle for morals and morale—all of these produced new opportunities for faiths and for the state. It was, after all, a war job. Just as the placement of railroad tracks and federal highways expressed a value for certain people, neighborhoods, and towns over others, so too did regulations over education requirements for chaplains, the acceptable initials on dog tags, the provision or lack thereof of ritual food, the appropriate times for sabbath observance, and a slew of other policies about religion, distinguished some religions as more acceptable or more American than others. And just as the provision of electricity and water generate regional growth and unintended environmental consequences, so too did the inclusion of new religions in the military, through commissioning chaplains from new faiths but also through accommodations for soldiers from an even wider variety of faith, change the religious landscape of the military and, through it, American society. Sometimes these decisions enhanced pluralism, and at other times it prompted sectarianism.

To be clear, in characterizing the military chaplaincy as a public utility, I’m neither advocating for it as an uncontroversial or unproblematic good, nor am I asserting that it needs to be run like a municipal service. Rather, I’m arguing that conceiving of the chaplaincy historically as a public utility has a lot of analytic and explanatory power for an institution that skirts constitutional separation of Church and state. Framing the chaplaincy as a public utility helps explain how the government could run a religious program, why pragmatism explains many but not all decisions, why race and religion are so intertwined in the military, and why the efforts to civilianize the chaplaincy during Vietnam failed. Most importantly, viewing the chaplaincy as a public utility helps explain how it has operated as a simultaneously paternalistic, pluralistic, and always contested space.

Margot Canaday:

It’s a pleasure to be here. Great to see some old friends and to have this opportunity to share a few thoughts about Ronit Stahl’s fascinating history of the military chaplaincy. I confess I think I’m only somewhat equipped for this job as someone who was raised in the Unitarian Church by parents who were almost evangelical in their atheism, and who’s never made much of an attempt since to fill in the weird
lacuna this has created in my own understanding about American religious life and practice. But I have thought a fair amount about bureaucracy and the state and citizenship, all of which are important in Ronit’s work, and I’m confident that there are plenty of other people here today who can bring a more sophisticated analysis than I can when it comes to the history of religion. So, with that by the way of preface, the three stories that Ronit just told us hint at what an unusually readable and gripping book this will be. But it’s not only fascinating, it’s also important, for it made me think about how incredibly understudied the US military is by historians given how significant the institution has been in American life. This is especially odd—those of you who are historians may not realize this, but historian’s pursuits are so often driven by the present. Think, for example, about how the great economic crash of 2008 has basically produced a new field in the history of capitalism, yet we are well into our second decade of war and this does not seem to have produced a related bubbling up of work by historians on the military and militarization. I can think of a few exemptions, of course; there is James Sparrow’s book on the warfare state, Meredith Lare’s recent book on the consumer culture within the armed services during Vietnam, Armed with Abundance, Jennifer Middlestat’s recent book on the welfare state inside the US military; there’s Laura Mackenany’s forthcoming study looking at how American society transitions from wartime to peacetime, and probably others that I’m not familiar with. But military history is not the booming field it ought to be given the current state of national and international affairs. So one of the things I’m excited about in Ronit’s work is its potential to remind American historians generally that the military is much too important to leave to a small group of fairly stymied scholars who write about air campaigns or submarine battles or this or that general. I like Ronit’s work too as a history of the state, especially for its on-the-ground look at what the state is and does, and also for the way it brings culture and bureaucracy together. This study of the military chaplaincy also forces us to really think about the separation of church and state and how friendly that separation has been in the American context. In the figure of the military chaplain, after all, we see not just the peaceful coexistence of church and state, but a mutual dependence. The military needed its chaplains, in part because war involves death, and as Ronit says, death is handled differently by different faiths. But it’s different than that, of course. Religion was also used to sanctify military action, in Ronit’s words, and I liked very much her consideration of how much more complicated the chaplain’s work became when civilian communities were so divided about the morality of America’s involvement in that front. But religion also needed the state. In the figure of the chaplain, we see how important it is to the religious that the state see them and value them, and we see how the military chaplaincy was an identity-producing machine. It’s a big deal to have a J on your dog tag rather than an H; it’s troubling for a Mormon to get a P rather than an LDS. Ronit’s discussion of the dog tag made me think of Gail Solomon’s work on state identity documents for trans people, and I recommend the chapter in Solomon’s book on the state’s withholding the letter, which seems so relevant here. I don’t really think the military’s initial reluctance to expand the options for dog tags beyond P, C, and H, had much to do with administrative convenience as it claimed, even if as many as 250 different religions might have
demanded their own designation. Anyone who has worked in military records knows how amazingly good the institution is at managing complexity, at reducing everything to a decimal number and filing it neatly away. I think it has more to do with the ideological function of consensus, and Ronit is especially good on the simultaneously progressive and conservative ways in which the military managed difference through the chaplaincy. As with race, the military's efforts at religion integration often marked it as a site of social experimentation within a hierarchical and coercive environment, and I think it’s absolutely fascinating that before WW1 the military had already opened to faiths outside mainline Protestants and Catholics, or that by WW2 the military intentionally required chaplains of different faiths to share a lodging. Now, those are only some of the aspects of Ronit’s work that I especially admire, and I don’t want to take too much time away from the larger discussion, but let me also just pose a few questions I had about things I’d be intrigued to know more about.

Now, perhaps because I grew up with Father Mulcagey on MASH, that was my religious training, before I had encountered Ronit's work, I never thought about how peculiar it is that there are chaplains in the military, but her work denaturalizes phenomena enough for me that it led me to start thinking about all the secular state institutions that have chaplains attached to them. The US Senate and the US house, for example, but some of the really big ones are, of course, hospitals and prisons. And because of the way that hospitals are places where death and dying are also prevalent, it strikes me as more like the military context than prisons do, but prisons are pretty distinctive, and I wonder if as a thought experiment, Ronit may gain even further conceptual purchase on the role and function of military chaplains by contrasting them to their counterparts in prisons. In prisons, chaplains aren’t so concerned with death and dying, but perhaps their function has more to do with rehabilitation. I’m especially interested in what the contrast between the military and the prison might tell us about religion and citizenship, as the military certainly is citizenship’s most exalted space while the prison is its most negated. In the military, access to a chaplain who can minister to one’s particular faith seems to be a benefit that is paired to the citizen’s obligation to bear arms, but what is it in the prison? Does it have to do with an integrative function that is connected to a need for social control? And if so, then I’m back to thinking about how the exercise of state power require religion, whether in a military or a carceral context. Or maybe it says that the right to exercise one’s religion is a right of citizenship that will not be stripped away from convicts even as their voting rights are in jeopardy. If so, that’s interesting as well.

Secondly, I wondered about the comparative dimensions of the military chaplaincy. How did other nations incorporate chaplains in their militaries, and I’m particularly interested in those Western European nations where church and state relations could be far more hostile than in the U.S. I’m also interested in thinking about chaplains as brokers across the nation states, as various forces of Allied forces were divided by nationality, but they might have been united as Catholics or Mormons or
Jews, and what does thinking about chaplains in these particular nodes have to tell us about transnational histories of religion?

Third, I wanted to ask Ronit more about how gender might matter in the book she’s writing, especially set against a broader feminization of religion. How should we think about the fact that these chaplains worked and ministered in almost totally masculine spaces? How might chaplains have worked with military families and shaped military policy on matters pertaining to sexuality, marriage, and family? What do we know about the entry of women in the chaplaincy, which I presume must have come in some way after the advent of the Volunteer Force and integration of women into the military more generally.

Finally, because it’s drawn from my own work, I wanted to ask more about Ronit’s notion that with regard to religion in the military, regulation changed what was regulated. The military was incorporating religion, integrating it, using it, and it was certainly shaping the idea of an interfaith America, but I’d like to hear more about how the military was regulating religion, and by that I mean I’d like to hear more about the religious norms that the military was demanding adherence to, and in particular I have a question about how this notion of regulation might fit with the notion of theological looseness that she also posits, this vast space that the military seemed to offer around religious belief and practice. “The military did not force faith,” Ronit says, so I’d like some help in thinking about how to think about these things—regulation alongside this looseness and fluidity. That’s probably more than Ronit can or wants to address, so I’ll close by addressing one other thing that reading this fascinating paper made me think about. When I was in high school, I briefly dated a Marine; in college, an Army Reservist. These were short, not very meaningful affairs, but it is with some pride that I report that I made it out of both of those relationships with a set of each of their dog tags. To be honest, I had never really noticed that religion was demarcated, and so, as I’m on the East Coast, housebound during the blizzard this past weekend, I went rattling around for those tags in the basement. Miraculously I found them; I considered bringing them as a prop, and both were Protestants, as it turns out. That’s just one final, personal reason why Ronit Stahl’s elegant paper was so engaging and interesting for me, and I’m looking forward very much to what will be a terrific and important book.

Thanks.

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